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Appellate procedure gets little attention. Politicians have
never heard of it, law school barely mentions it, and lawyers prefer
search-and-seizure doctrine to the dry intricacies of appellate rules.
This is unfortunate. Since 1970, over two million people have been
convicted of a crime in New York.1 This number continues to
climb. In this massive system of convictions, an appeal is often the
last chance to correct an error that will have a life-changing impact
on the accused. But while the New York State Constitution and
Criminal Procedure Law establish a right to appeal,2 that right is
burdened with procedural hurdles. “Preservation” is perhaps the
biggest one.
New York preservation rules generally require that parties
cannot argue a point on appeal that they did not raise at trial.3 This
doctrine creates a “speak now or forever hold your peace”
mandate—if defense counsel does not speak up, his client loses the
claim forever. As the Appellate Divisions annually reject thousands
of criminal appeals on preservation grounds, preservation often
means the difference between liberty and prison. Given these
stakes, preservation rules must be fair. When it comes to
“sufficiency of the evidence” appeals, they are not.
Under the state and federal due process clauses, the
government cannot incarcerate someone without proof of guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.4 A violation of this “sufficiency of the
evidence” rule (“sufficiency”) is “the most fundamental of all
possible defects in a criminal proceeding.”5 Recognizing as much,
the New York legislature has expressly guaranteed appellants the
right to argue that the “evidence adduced at a trial . . . was not
legally sufficient to establish the defendant’s guilt of an offense of
which he was convicted[.]”6
Sufficiency arguments come in many different forms, ranging
from categorical arguments about the Penal Law’s scope (e.g., a
1 ASS’N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y., THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE OPERATIONS
COMM., THE CORR. & CMTY. REENTRY COMM., & THE CRIMINAL ADVOCACY COMM.,
REPORT ON LEGISLATION BY THE CRIMINAL COURTS COMMITTEE 2 (2015), http://
www2.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/20072824-ReportonA.7030S.5169reSealing
MisdemeanorFelonyRecords.pdf [http://perma.cc/42K3-8SVQ].
2 N.Y. CONST., art. XI, § 4, art. VI, § 4(k); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 450.10
(McKinney 2015); People v. Ventura, 17 N.Y.3d 675, 681 (2011); People v. Callahan,
80 N.Y.2d 273, 284 (1992); People v. Pollenz, 67 N.Y.2d 264 (1986).
3 See CRIM. PROC. § 470.05(2); see also People v. Gray, 86 N.Y.2d 10 (1995).
4 See U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV; see also N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6; Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 309 (1979) (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970)); CRIM.
PROC. § 70.20.
5 People v. Udzinski, 146 A.D.2d 245, 250 (2d Dep’t 1989).
6 CRIM. PROC. § 470.15(4)(b).
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disorderly-conduct defendant concedes that he yelled in a subway
but argues that the disorderly conduct statute does not cover a
mere rant),7 to fact-specific arguments (e.g., the government failed
to prove physical injury in an assault case).8 In some cases, the
sufficiency argument will amount to a claim of actual innocence—
that is, the evidence affirmatively proves that the defendant did not
commit the charged offense.9 The United States Supreme Court
has referred to these actual-innocence errors as a manifest
injustice, and has ordered federal habeas courts to review those
errors despite counsel’s failure to object at trial.10
To win a sufficiency argument, the defendant must establish
that, even when the facts are viewed in a “light most favorable” to
the government, no rational juror could find guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.11 If the court finds insufficient evidence, the
accused is pronounced “not guilty” and the case is dismissed.
But under People v. Gray, the government can incarcerate an
innocent defendant regardless of the weakness of the government’s
proof. Gray held that if the defendant fails to “preserve” a
sufficiency argument, the claim is not reviewable on appeal.12
People v. Finch recently challenged Gray’s logic.13 Finch
suggested that where the record conclusively establishes a
sufficiency defect—that is, the government could not possibly have
“cured” the error—preservation should not apply.14 In those cases,
Finch explained, counsel’s omission did not “prejudice” the
government, and applying preservation would “raise the disturbing
possibility that factually innocent defendants will suffer criminal
punishment for no good reason.”15
This article argues that the Court of Appeals should expressly
overrule Gray and hold, as Finch strongly suggests, that preservation
does not apply to sufficiency appeals when the record affirmatively
establishes an incurable sufficiency defect.16 To justify that theory,
this article explains Gray’s rationales and then attempts to
dismantle them.
7 People v. Gonzalez, 25 N.Y.3d 1100, 1101 (2015).
8 See In re Phillip A., 49 N.Y.2d 198 (1980).
9 See People v. Hamilton, 115 A.D.3d 12, 28 (2d Dep’t 2014).
10 Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 388 (2004) (citing Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478
(1986)).
11 See People v. Williams, 84 N.Y.2d 925, 926 (1994).
12 People v. Gray, 86 N.Y.2d 10, 19 (1995).
13 People v. Finch, 23 N.Y.3d 408 (2014).
14 See id.
15 Id. at 413-15 (emphasis added).
16 See id.
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Part I explains Gray’s analysis and Finch’s counter-arguments.
Part II attacks Gray’s theory that preservation is a state
constitutional rule. Part III argues that preservation is not a
jurisdictional rule, and is thus subject to exceptions when the
interests underlying the doctrine do not apply. From that premise,
Part IV proposes a sufficiency exception to the preservation rule
because affirming a baseless conviction on preservation grounds
offends basic justice and advances no state interests. Finally, Part V
contends that the state and federal due process clauses require a
sufficiency exception to the preservation rule.
I. THE PRESERVATION DOCTRINE: FROM GRAY TO FINCH
Under Gray, preservation compliance typically involves the ut-
terance of a few short sentences at the end of the government’s
case-in-chief.17 For instance, a defense attorney might object that,
(1) “the government failed to prove serious injury (an element of
some assault prosecutions) because the injuries were too minor;”
(2) “the government failed to prove that the defendant was the
person who committed the robbery;” or (3) “the government failed
to disprove self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt where video
evidence shows that the defendant was attacked with a knife.” In
turn, the trial judge usually denies the motion without explanation,
or utters a few sentences about the motion’s problems.
Gray offered several justifications for this sufficiency preserva-
tion rule:
• Constitutional Argument: “Under article VI, § 3 of the New
York State Constitution, the Court of Appeals, with limited
exceptions, is empowered to consider only ‘questions of
law.’”18
• Curing: A sufficiency objection might provide the govern-
ment the opportunity to cure the sufficiency defect “before
a verdict is reached and a cure is no longer possible.”19
• Efficiency and Finality: Sufficiency objections allow the
court to dismiss the case at the earliest possible point, thus
saving resources and bringing the case to a swift
resolution.20
17 See People v. Gray, 86 N.Y.2d 10, 19 (1995).
18 Id. at 20 (quoting N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 3).
19 Id. at 20-21.
20 See People v. Hawkins, 11 N.Y.3d 484, 492 (2008) (“A defendant’s motion for a
trial order of dismissal that specifies the alleged infirmity helps to assure that legally
insufficient charges will not be submitted for the jury’s consideration, and serves the
overall interest in an efficient, effective justice system.”); see also Gray, 86 N.Y.2d at 21.
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• Guidance: Sufficiency motions trigger lower-court rulings,
which in turn provide guidance to the appellate courts.21
• Alternative Remedies: Even if preservation is required, de-
fendants can still argue sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims
before the Appellate Division (not the Court of Appeals,
though) by requesting “interest-of-justice” review.22 Under
interest-of-justice review, an appellate court has unfettered
and unreviewable discretion to review sufficiency claims that
were not raised below.23
The Court of Appeals has extended Gray to attacks on the facial
constitutionality of a statute.24 So, if New York decides to ban birth
control, a New Yorker can serve time for violating that unconstitu-
tional ban if he or she is unfortunate enough to be saddled with a
lawyer who slept through a first-year constitutional law class.
People v. Finch has called Gray into question.25 In Finch, the po-
lice arrested Mr. Finch for an alleged trespass into a public-housing
complex.26 The defendant physically challenged the arrest and was
charged with resisting arrest.27 On appeal, Mr. Finch argued that
the arresting officer lacked probable cause of trespass (a necessary
element of the resisting arrest charge) because the officer knew
that a tenant had invited Mr. Finch to the complex.28 Further,
while housing management had told the officer that Mr. Finch was
no longer welcome, Mr. Finch contended that there was no evi-
dence that management had the contractual authority to override
a tenant’s invitation.29 During arraignment, the lower court ruled
that management had the authority to override a tenant’s invita-
tion, thus defeating Mr. Finch’s probable cause theory.30 In turn,
Mr. Finch did not advance that same argument during his trial,
and a jury convicted him.31
21 Hawkins, 11 N.Y.3d at 493 (“[The Court of Appeals’] second level of [appellate]
review—‘to authoritatively declare and settle the law uniformly throughout the
state’—is best accomplished when the Court determines legal issues of statewide sig-
nificance that have first been considered by both the trial and the intermediate appel-
late court.” (quoting Reed v. McCord, 160 N.Y. 330, 335 (1899))).
22 Gray, 86 N.Y.2d at 22 (citing N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 470.15(3)).
23 See CRIM. PROC. § 470.15(6)(a); see also People v. Belge, 41 N.Y.2d 60, 61-62
(1976).
24 See People v. Baumann & Sons Buses, Inc., 6 N.Y.3d 404 (2006).
25 See People v. Finch, 23 N.Y.3d 408 (2014).
26 Id. at 410-11.
27 Id. at 412.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 417.
30 Id. at 412.
31 Id.
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In attacking preservation, the Finch dissent advanced a “tim-
ing” point, arguing that a defendant cannot “preserve” a suffi-
ciency claim by challenging the validity of the government’s theory
before trial.32 Instead, a mid-trial sufficiency motion is required—
even if the pre-trial court already rejected the argument.33
The Finch majority rejected this repetition rule, relying heavily
on a “futility” theory:
Having received an adverse ruling [before trial], defendant did
not specifically urge the same theory again in support of his mo-
tion to dismiss for insufficiency of the evidence at trial. But he
did not have to: once is enough[.] . . . As a general matter, a
lawyer is not required, in order to preserve a point, to repeat an
argument that the court has definitively rejected. When a court
rules, a litigant is entitled to take the court at its word. Contrary
to what the dissent appears to suggest, a defendant is not re-
quired to repeat an argument whenever there is a new proceed-
ing or a new judge.34
Thus, Finch did not reject Gray’s preservation command. In-
stead, Finch held that Gray’s preservation command was satisfied
because the defendant raised the sufficiency theory “at the earliest
possible moment—at arraignment.”35 But while the majority reaf-
firmed Gray, it also advanced arguments that threaten to overrule
Gray, at least when the record affirmatively establishes an “incur-
able” sufficiency defect:
[Our reaffirmation of Gray] does not imply, however, that a spe-
cific objection in a trial motion to dismiss is always necessary
where, as is true in this case, such a requirement will not signifi-
cantly advance the purposes for which the preservation rule was
designed. There will be cases, of which this is one, where the
lack of a specific motion has caused no prejudice to the People and
no interference with the swift and orderly course of justice. Insis-
tence on specificity in a dismissal motion is amply justified
where the People might have cured the problem if their attention
had been called to it. . . . [W]hile the rule of Gray is generally a
sound one, an overbroad application of it would raise the dis-
turbing possibility that factually innocent defendants will suffer
criminal punishment for no good reason. . . . The dissent re-
sponds by saying, essentially, that procedural rules do sometimes
require us to uphold convictions of people who may be inno-
cent[.] . . . True enough; but procedural rules should be so de-
32 Id. at 422-27 (Abdus-Salaam, J., dissenting).
33 Id.
34 Id. at 412-13 (citing People v. Mahboubian, 74 N.Y.2d 174, 188 (1989)).
35 Id. at 412.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CNY\19-1\CNY101.txt unknown Seq: 7 25-FEB-16 10:31
2015] SUFFICIENCY-OF-THE-EVIDENCE EXCEPTION 7
signed as to keep unjust results to a minimum. We think our
interpretation of Gray serves that end better than the dissent’s.36
Finch explained that Gray could have been rooted in a “curing”
rationale because if the Gray defendants had raised a sufficiency
argument (the Gray defendants claimed that the government failed
to prove knowledge of the weight of the narcotics), “the People
might have reopened their case to supply the missing proof.”37 On
the other hand, if the record affirmatively indicates an incurable
defect in the government’s case, applying preservation would re-
quire an appellate court to “uphold[ ] the conviction of an inno-
cent man, without significantly advancing any valid purpose.”38
In applying the “curing” principle, Finch held that the record
affirmatively established an incurable sufficiency defect: the ab-
sence of probable cause.39 Accordingly, the objection omission did
not “prejudice” the government and the claim was reviewable.40
To get a better sense of Finch’s “curing” rationale, consider an
endangerment-of-the-welfare-of-a-child prosecution: the govern-
ment’s theory is that the defendant served liquor to a “child less
than seventeen years old.”41 The defendant argues, for the first
time on appeal, that the government failed to prove that the child
was under seventeen. Under these circumstances, trial counsel’s
objection omission may have prejudiced the government. The gov-
ernment could have, if placed on notice of the age problem, cured
that problem by presenting a birth certificate or calling a witness.
On the other hand, if the complainant testified that she was twenty-
one at the time of the offense, and there was no indication that the
government could have somehow rehabilitated that testimony, the
defect is incurable—the government simply has no case.
Finch relied heavily on a “futility” approach and expressly reaf-
firmed Gray. So, while Finch referred to the affirmance of convic-
tions of factually innocent defendants as a “disturbing
36 Id. at 414-16 (emphasis added).
37 Id. at 415.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 417-18 (“But in light of the undisputed fact, reflected in a video recording,
that [the tenant] enthusiastically espoused defendant’s cause in [the arresting of-
ficer’s] presence, we do not see how a jury could find, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that [the arresting officer] did not know . . . that defendant was present with [the
tenant’s] consent.”); id. at 414-15.
40 Id. at 414-16; see also People v. McLean, 15 N.Y.3d 117, 121 (2010) (applying a
curing approach to right-to-counsel suppression claims and holding that a defendant
may only argue, for the first time on appeal, that his statements were secured in viola-
tion of his right to counsel if the record “irrefutably” proves the violation).
41 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 260.10(1) (McKinney 2015).
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possibility,”42 and advanced arguments that justify overruling Gray
when the objection omission worked no prejudice, Finch left Gray
intact.
About a year after Finch, the Court of Appeals had the oppor-
tunity to adopt a curing approach to sufficiency appeals but passed
it up. In People v. Jorgensen, the defendant was “convicted of man-
slaughter for reckless conduct that she engaged in while pregnant
that caused injury to the fetus in utero where the child was born
alive but died as a result of that injury days later . . . .”43 The defen-
dant then argued, for the first time on appeal, that the reckless
manslaughter statute does not apply to a pregnant woman who in-
jures an unborn fetus in utero, thus rendering the manslaughter
evidence insufficient.44
Jorgensen is a classic example of an “incurable” sufficiency de-
fect. The defendant’s argument hinged on an interpretation of the
Penal Law and rested on uncontested facts. Thus, the failure to
object did not prejudice the government because the defect was
incurable.45 As Ms. Jorgensen’s appellate counsel explained during
oral argument: “If you believed all of everything that the prosecu-
tor offered in this case, no question about it, everything that’s to be
believed, the argument remains the same. There’s nothing that . . .
an objection can cure at this point.”46 Chief Judge Lippman later
asked the prosecution during oral argument if preservation applies
when “it’s impossible to commit the crime [under the statute.]”47
The Court, however, reached the merits without discussing preser-
vation, thus leaving this preservation question open.
The Court of Appeals should overrule Gray and hold, as Finch
strongly suggests, that preservation does not apply to sufficiency
appeals when the record affirmatively indicates an incurable suffi-
ciency defect.48
42 Finch, 23 N.Y.3d.at 415.
43 People v. Jorgensen, No. 179, 2015 WL 6180890 (N.Y. Oct. 22, 2015).
44 See Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 70-84, People v. Jorgensen, No. 179, 2015
WL 6180890 (N.Y. Oct. 22, 2015) (“Defendant-Appellant Was Convicted of a Crime
That Was Not Legally Possible for Her to Commit under New York Law”).
45 Id. at 70-72; see also Transcript of Oral Argument at 7-9, People v. Jorgensen, No.
179, 2015 WL 6180890 (N.Y. Oct. 22, 2015).
46 Transcript of Oral Argument at 9, People v. Jorgensen, No. 179, 2015 WL
6180890 (N.Y. Oct. 22, 2015).
47 Id.
48 See People v. Finch, 23 N.Y.3d 408, 413-14 (2014).
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II. THE PRESERVATION RULE IS A STATUTORY RULE,
NOT A CONSTITUTIONAL RULE
Gray argues that the preservation rule is a state constitutional
rule: “The preservation rule is necessary for several reasons. Under
article VI, § 3 of the New York Constitution, the Court of Appeals,
with limited exceptions, is empowered to consider only ‘questions
of law.’”49
It is unclear why Gray considered the preservation rule’s “na-
ture” to be relevant. After all, courts must enforce the rule regard-
less of its constitutional character. Gray also did not even suggest
that the preservation rule is a constitutional rule in the Appellate
Divisions, so Gray’s constitutional theory is irrelevant to sufficiency
review in those intermediate appellate courts. Ultimately, it seems
like the Court was suggesting that constitutional rules are more
“important” than statutory ones, and thus preservation is “very im-
portant”—so important that there is not even an exception for de-
fendants convicted on insufficient evidence.
Gray’s constitutional analysis is wrong; preservation is a statu-
tory rule and nothing more. The Court’s constitutional theory goes
something like this: article VI, § 3(a) says that the “jurisdiction of
the court of appeals shall be limited to the review of questions of
law” and “question of law” is statutorily defined as a “preserved”
claim.50 Thus, the theory goes, article VI, § 3(a)’s “question of law”
provision means “preserved question of law.”51  This argument mis-
reads the Constitution.
Article VI, § 3’s “question of law” provision says nothing about
preservation, objections, or anything of the kind; the provision
only says “questions of law.” If the “question of law” requirement
49 People v. Gray, 86 N.Y.2d 10, 20 (1995) (quoting N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 3(a);
citing People v. Belge, 41 N.Y.2d 60 (1976)).
50 See Misicki v. Caradonna, 12 N.Y.3d 511, 524 (2009) (Graffeo, J., dissenting) (“I
view the preservation requirement as a constitutional limitation on this Court’s juris-
diction.” (citing N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 3(a))); see also People v. Payne, 3 N.Y.3d 266,
274 (2004) (Read, J., dissenting) (“Preservation is not simply a ‘formality’ . . . . Under
the State Constitution, this Court, with limited exceptions not applicable here, can
consider only ‘questions of law.’ . . . Generally, a question of law is an issue that was
preserved by a sufficiently specific and timely objection at trial . . . .” (first quoting
N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 3(a); second quoting N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 470.35 (McKinney
2015)); and then citing Gray, 86 N.Y.2d at 20)); see also People v. Knowles, 88 N.Y.2d
763, 768 n.1 (1996).
51 See Hecker v. State, 20 N.Y.3d 1087, 1088 (2013) (Smith, J., concurring) (“The
underlying assumption seems to be that unpreserved questions of law are not ques-
tions of law at all . . . .”).
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had something to do with preservation, the constitutional framers
would have said so.
Indeed, nothing about the phrase “question of law” suggests a
preservation rule. A question being a “question of law” hinges on
the substance of the question, not the procedural history of that ques-
tion’s litigation. Consider the following question: Does the Fourth
Amendment permit warrantless searches of homes? This is a “ques-
tion of law” since it goes to the boundaries of a constitutional right.
If suppression counsel fails to argue that the Fourth Amendment
prohibits warrantless home searches, this question is still a “ques-
tion of law,” albeit an unpreserved one.52
New York Criminal Procedure Law (“C.P.L.”) § 470.05(2),
which the Court seems to have relied upon to interpret article VI,
§ 3(a) as establishing a constitutional preservation rule, is irrele-
vant. That statute says:
For purposes of appeal, a question of law with respect to a ruling
or instruction of a criminal court during a trial or proceeding is
presented when a protest thereto was registered, by the party
claiming error, at the time of such ruling or instruction or at any
subsequent time when the court had an opportunity of effec-
tively changing the same.53
Even if that statute defined “question of law” to mean “pre-
served question of law” (it does not), a statute cannot define the
meaning of a constitutional provision.54 Congress cannot, for in-
stance, say that the Second Amendment’s right “to keep and bear
arms” means “the right to keep a handgun but not bullets.” That
rule could only come from a constitutional amendment.
Nothing in article VI, § 3’s purpose suggests that “question of
law” has anything to do with “preservation.”55 The 1894 framers
created article VI, § 3 to establish the Court of Appeals as the
State’s High Court for the same reason that legislatures have always
created high courts: to authoritatively resolve questions of state-
wide significance (in contrast to everyday factual questions such as,
“Was the light green?”).56 The Constitutional Convention floor de-
bates hammer this message home:
1894 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION MEMBER CHOATE:
52 See People v. Riley, 19 N.Y.3d 944, 947-49 (2012) (Pigott, J., dissenting).
53 CRIM. PROC. § 470.05(2) (emphasis added).
54 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997).
55 N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 3(a).
56 See Reed v. McCord, 160 N.Y. 330, 335 (1899) (explaining that the Court of
Appeals was established to “authoritatively declare and settle the law uniformly
throughout the state.”).
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[New York Law] should be the same for the whole State; [ ]
should be a consistent and harmonious system; [and] should be
declared clearly and authoritatively by some supreme power, in
order not merely that litigants may have their right, but that the
whole people may know what is the law, by which their contracts
and conduct shall be regulated, and by the observance of which
they may, if possible, keep out of litigation. It is this necessity alone
which justifies the existence of a Court of Appeals . . . .57
This history indicates that the “question of law” provision dis-
tinguishes between “legal” questions and “factual” questions. Thus,
Constitutional Convention Member Choate could, without contra-
diction from any convention members, explain that the “cardinal
virtue” of article VI of the State Constitution was its “making the
Court of Appeals strictly a court of law and not of fact.”58
Instead of being a constitutional rule, preservation is a statu-
tory rule, stemming from C.P.L. § 470.05(2).59 That statute estab-
lishes two distinct standards. First, the question must be a “question
of law” and not a “question of fact.”60 Second, the appellant must
have “protested” “below.”61 Thus, when analyzing preservation, the
only relevant legislative authority is C.P.L. § 470.05. Article VI,
§ 3(a)’s “question of law” mandate is irrelevant.62
The preservation rule’s statutory versus constitutional charac-
ter may be academic since courts must enforce the rule regardless
of its constitutional character. Still, the Court of Appeals seems to
think character matters, so it is important to get this right.
III. PRESERVATION IS NOT “JURISDICTIONAL”
The Court of Appeals has also suggested, without offering any
analysis, that the preservation rule is “jurisdictional.”63 Judge Read
57 2 REVISED RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF NEW
YORK 464 (Hon. William H. Steele reviser, The Albany Co. Printers, 1900) (1894)
(emphasis added).
58 Id.




63 E.g., Bezio v. Dorsey, 21 N.Y.3d 93, 98 (2013) (“The threshold issue here is a
jurisdictional question—whether the inmate’s claim that the force-feeding order vio-
lated his constitutional right to refuse medical treatment was preserved for review.”);
People v. Umali, 10 N.Y.3d 417, 423 n.2 (2008) (“To the extent defendant relies on a
theory of judicial estoppel because the People did not raise preservation in the courts
below, we note that estoppel does not vest jurisdiction in this Court where it does not
otherwise exist.”); People v. Turriago, 90 N.Y.2d 77, 80 (1997) (“We conclude that the
first argument, having not been preserved, is beyond the jurisdiction of this Court.
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and Judge Graffeo have more forcefully expressed this view in con-
curring and dissenting opinions.64 By definition, jurisdictional
rules are categorical barriers to appellate review that permit no ex-
ceptions.65 Thus, if the preservation rule is “jurisdictional,” a suffi-
ciency exception is dead on arrival.
Contrary to the Court of Appeals’ conclusory analysis, preser-
vation is not jurisdictional. Instead, it is a “prudential” rule that,
like mootness,66 statute of limitations defenses,67 and pleading
rules,68 is subject to policy and fairness exceptions.
Courts “loosely use[ ]” the “jurisdictional” label, thus prompt-
ing high courts to demand discipline in its use.69 Parsing the dis-
tinction between jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional rules is
difficult. It is perhaps most useful to consider what jurisdictional
does not mean. Jurisdictional does not mean “threshold,” nor does
it refer to a mere element of a cause of action or appeal.70 Instead,
the label “refers to objections that are ‘fundamental to the power
of adjudication of a court’ . . . . ‘Lack of jurisdiction’ . . . [means]
that the matter before the court was not the kind of matter on
which the court had power to rule.”71 Put another way, a jurisdic-
tional rule goes to “a court’s competence to entertain an action.”72
The “jurisdictional” label has drastic practical significance.73 A
Unlike the trial courts and the Appellate Division, this Court’s jurisdiction is limited
to issues of law and, with extremely limited exceptions (none of which is applicable
here), issues that have not been preserved in the trial court are beyond our power of
review.”).
64 Misicki v. Caradonna, 12 N.Y.3d 511, 524 (2009) (Graffeo, J., dissenting) (“I
view the preservation requirement as a constitutional limitation on this Court’s juris-
diction.” (citing N.Y. CONST. art VI, § 3(a))); see also People v. Payne, 3 N.Y.3d 266,
274-75 (2004) (Read, J., dissenting).
65 See, e.g., Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 214 (2007); Adams v. Robertson, 520
U.S. 83, 89-91 (1997); Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58, 64 (1970); Fleishman v.
Cont’l Cas. Co., 698 F.3d 598, 608-09 (7th Cir. 2012); Misicki, 12 N.Y.3d at 525 (Smith,
J., dissenting); see also Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Justiciability and Separation of Powers: A Neo-
Federalist Approach, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 393, 490, 490 n.472 (1996).
66 U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 400 (1980) (noting the “flexi-
ble” character of the mootness doctrine).
67 See McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1934 (2013).
68 See Manhattan Telecomms. Corp. v. H & A Locksmith, Inc., 21 N.Y.3d 200, 203-
04 (2013).
69 See id. at 203 (“[T]he word ‘jurisdiction’ is often loosely used.”) (citing Lacks v.
Lacks, 41 N.Y.2d 71, 74-75 (1976)).
70 Id.
71 Id. (internal citations omitted).
72 Lacks, 41 N.Y.2d at 75 (citing Thrasher v. U.S. Liab. Ins. Co., 19 N.Y.2d 159, 166
(1967)) (emphasis added).
73 Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 641, 648 (2012) (citing Henderson v. Shinseki,
562 U.S. 428, 435) (2011)).
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party cannot waive a jurisdictional objection and courts must con-
sider jurisdictional problems sua sponte.74 “Many months of work
on the part of the attorneys and the court may be wasted,” as par-
ties may brief and argue an issue only to later find out that the
appellate court lacks jurisdiction.75
On the other hand, if a rule is non-jurisdictional, courts have
discretion to ignore it for good reasons, e.g., fairness and sound
judicial administration.76 For instance, the statute of limitations de-
fense is non-jurisdictional, so courts can create exceptions to the
statute of limitations bar when fairness supports doing so (e.g., the
doctrine of equitable tolling).77 On the other hand, the mandate
that a defendant must file a notice of appeal within a prescribed
period is jurisdictional and is thus not subject to fairness
exceptions.78
It is simple for the Legislature to expressly say that a rule is
jurisdictional. Thus, the Court of Appeals has looked for an “ex-
press statutory limitation on the courts’ subject matter jurisdic-
tion.”79 The United States Supreme Court has similarly adopted a
“readily administrable bright line” inquiry: is there a “clear indica-
tion” that the legislature intended the rule to be jurisdictional?80
This simple approach, which requires the Legislature to expressly
declare a rule jurisdictional, prevents needless judicial guesswork.81
The United States Supreme Court and the federal circuit
courts have found preservation to be non-jurisdictional.82 Textual
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 See, e.g., Misicki v. Caradonna, 12 N.Y.3d 511, 525 (2009) (Smith, J., dissenting);
see also Bogle-Assegai v. Connecticut, 470 F.3d 498, 504 (2d Cir. 2006); Simcuski v.
Saeli, 44 N.Y.2d 442, 448-49 (1978).
77 Saeli, 44 N.Y.2d at 448-49.
78 See People v. Thomas, 47 N.Y.2d 37, 43 (1979).
79 Fry v. Vill. of Tarrytown, 89 N.Y.2d 714, 719, 721 (1997), superseded by statute, N.Y.
C.P.L.R. 2001 (McKinney 2007), as recognized in Ruffin v. Lion Corp., 15 N.Y.3d 578,
581 (2010).
80 Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 429 (2011) (internal quotations omitted)
(citing Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 515-16 (2006)).
81 Id.
82 See Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 533 (1992) (explaining that the rule
against not considering “claims that were not raised or addressed below” is prudential
in federal courts (citing Carlson v. Greene, 446 U.S. 14, 17 n.2 (1980) (“This question
[raised on appeal] was presented in the petition for certiorari, but not in either the
District Court or the Court of Appeals. However, respondent does not object to its
decision by this Court. Though we do not normally decide issues not presented below,
we are not precluded from doing so . . . . Here, the issue is squarely presented and
fully briefed. It is an important, recurring issue and is properly raised in another
petition for certiorari being held pending disposition of this case . . . . We conclude
that the interests of judicial administration will be served by addressing the issue on its
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analysis, legislative history, precedent, and common sense establish
that the New York Court of Appeals should join this unanimous
federal view.
A. Textual Analysis
The statutory text establishes that preservation is not jurisdic-
tional. C.P.L. § 470.05(2) (the criminal-appellate preservation stat-
ute) and the criminal-appellate jurisdictional statutes contain no
“express statutory limitation on the courts’ subject matter jurisdic-
tion.”83 If the Legislature had wanted to render preservation juris-
dictional, it could easily have said so by declaring that, (1) the
appellate courts shall not review unpreserved claims; (2) the appel-
late court may not consider an unpreserved claim;84 or, more
bluntly, (3) that preservation is jurisdictional.85 The Legislature
said none of these things. Under Fry and Supreme Court prece-
dent, the absence of such an “express statutory limitation on the
courts’ subject matter jurisdiction” essentially ends the inquiry; the
rule is non-jurisdictional.86 But there is more.
B. Legislative History of the Preservation Doctrine
The legislative history hammers home the point. When the
Legislature drafted C.P.L. § 470.05(2), the appellate courts had al-
ready developed a non-jurisdictional practice—that is, the courts
merits.” (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted)))); see also Vento v. Dir. of
Virgin Is. Bureau of Internal Revenue, 715 F.3d 455, 470 (3d Cir. 2013); Starship
Enter. of Atlanta, Inc. v. Coweta Cty., 708 F.3d 1243, 1254 (11th Cir. 2013); United
States v. Wimbley, 553 F.3d 455, 460 (6th Cir. 2009); United States v. Covarrubia-
Mendiola, 241 F. App’x 569, 575 (10th Cir. 2007); Bogle-Assegai v. Connecticut, 470
F.3d 498, 504 (2d Cir. 2006); In re Sheridan, 362 F.3d 96, 105 (1st Cir. 2004); Freuden-
sprung v. Offshore Tech. Servs., Inc., 379 F.3d 327, 338 n.5 (5th Cir. 2004); Kingman
Park Civic Ass’n v. Williams, 348 F.3d 1033, 1039 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Amos v. Md. Dep’t
of Pub. Safety and Corr. Servs., 178 F.3d 212, 215 n.2 (4th Cir. 1999); Scott v. Ross,
140 F.3d 1275, 1283-84 (9th Cir. 1998). But see Fleishman v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 698 F.3d
598, 608 (7th Cir. 2012).
83 See Fry v. Vill. of Tarrytown, 89 N.Y.2d 714, 719 (1997); see also N.Y. CRIM. PROC.
LAW §§ 450.10-.90, 470.05-.60 (McKinney 2015).
84 Cf. United States v. Robinson, 361 U.S. 220, 224 (1960).
85 See id. (demonstrating that the express wording and plain meaning of a statute
can specify its jurisdictional nature); see also DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Spitzer, 7 N.Y.3d
653, 660 (2006).
86 See Fry, 89 N.Y.2d at 719, 721; see also Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 435
(2011); Lacks v. Lacks, 41 N.Y.2d 71, 75-76 (1976) (“Not even the catchall word ‘juris-
diction’ appears in the statute, much less an explicit limitation on the court’s compe-
tence to entertain the action. In no way do these limitations on the cause of action
circumscribe the power of the court in the sense of competence to adjudicate causes
in the matrimonial categories. That a court has no ‘right’ to adjudicate erroneously is
no circumscription of its power to decide, rightly or wrongly.”).
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had reviewed unpreserved claims when the error was incurable and
dispositive. As far back as 1870, Levin v. Russell explained that it was
well-settled law that unpreserved claims could be raised on appeal
if they would have been “decisive of the case, and could not have
been obviated [if brought to the victor’s attention below].”87  In
1919, Wright v. Wright again repeated that rule, holding that the
Court properly considered respondent’s unpreserved argument
because the argument “appeared upon the face of the record and
. . .  could not have been avoided if brought to the attention of the
appellant in the courts below.”88 Fifty years later, and two years
before the enactment of C.P.L. § 470.05(2), Telaro v. Telaro dis-
cussed the “liberalizing” preservation rule:
[T]he general rule concerning questions raised neither at the
trial nor at previous stages of appeal is far less restrictive than
some case language would indicate. Thus, it has been said: ‘if a
conclusive question is presented on appeal, it does not matter that the
question is a new one not previously suggested. No party should prevail
on appeal, given an unimpeachable showing that he had no case in the
trial court.’ Of course, where new contentions could have been
obviated or cured by factual showings or legal countersteps, they
may not be raised on appeal. But contentions which could not
have been so obviated or cured below may be raised on appeal
for the first time. There are some exceptions to this liberalizing
rule, none relevant to this case: they include concessions made
by counsel, new questions on motions for reargument, and most
constitutional questions.89
When the Legislature adopted the first preservation statute in
1946,90 and the modern C.P.L. in 1970, it acted against the back-
drop of Levin, Wright, and Telaro, which all treated preservation as
non-jurisdictional.91 Nothing in the text or legislative history of the
1946 and 1970 statutes demonstrates an intent to nullify the Court
of Appeals’ non-jurisdictional approach.92 Accordingly, the Legisla-
87 Levin v. Russell, 42 N.Y. 251, 255-56 (1870); see also People v. Bradner, 107 N.Y.
1, 4-5 (1887) (“The principal questions presented on this appeal . . . are questions
raised on the record alone, and which were not, in any way, called to the attention of
the trial court. If the record discloses upon its face . . . some other defect in the
proceedings, which could not be waived or cured and is fundamental, it would, as we con-
ceive, be the duty of an appellate tribunal to reverse the proceedings and conviction,
although the question had not been formally raised in the court below, and was not
presented by any ruling or exception on the trial.”) (emphasis added).
88 Wright v. Wright, 226 N.Y. 578, 578-79 (1919) (per curiam).
89 Telaro v. Telaro, 25 N.Y.2d 433, 439 (1969) (emphasis added).
90 N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 420-a (McKinney 1946) (former code).
91 See Levin, 42 N.Y. 251; see also Wright, 226 N.Y. 578; Telaro, 25 N.Y.2d 433.
92 STATE OF N. Y., TWELFTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF NEW
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ture should be “regarded as having legislated in the light of and as
having accepted”93 Levin, Wright, and Telaro’s non-jurisdictional in-
terpretation of the preservation requirement.94
C. The Preservation Rule is a Prudential Claim-Processing Rule
“Among the types of rules that should not be described as ju-
risdictional are . . . ‘claim-processing rules.’ These are rules that
seek to promote the orderly progress of litigation by requiring that the
parties take certain procedural steps at certain specified times.”95 This
claim-processing label perfectly describes preservation. Preserva-
tion rules require litigants to say “X” to access an appellate court—
that is, “take certain procedural steps at certain specified times.”96
In this sense, the rule is similar to non-jurisdictional statute of limi-
tations rules, which require litigants to assert a claim in a timely
fashion.97
Indeed, claim-processing rules, like preservation, do not go to
a court’s “competence” to entertain an appeal. The Appellate Divi-
sion’s duty is to ensure the accuracy of convictions; the Court of
Appeals’ duty is to resolve questions of statewide importance.98 It is
unclear why—and no New York Court has ever attempted to ex-
plain why—an appellate court is incompetent to consider an argu-
ment because counsel failed to utter a few words below.
D. Erecting a Jurisdictional Bar to Appellate Review Is Bad Policy
Treating preservation as a categorical bar to appellate review,
even when “common sense and practical necessity” support re-
view,99 is bad policy. As Judge Smith’s Misicki dissent observed, a
jurisdictional label would require the Court of Appeals to overrule
YORK 51-52 (1946); STATE OF N.Y. TEMP. COMM’N. ON REVISION OF THE PENAL LAW &
CRIMINAL CODE, PROPOSED N.Y. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW 322-23 (1967).
93 Orinoco Realty Co. v. Bandler, 233 N.Y. 24, 30 (1922).
94 See, e.g., Fry v. Vill. of Tarrytown, 89 N.Y.2d 714, 720-21 (1997) (“Since defects in
commencement [of a civil action] were waivable in the past, the same result should
obtain under the new system, especially given the complete absence of any legislative
design, much less an unequivocal legislative expression, to transform commencement
from a procedural step in the prosecution of an action into an unwaivable limitation
on the court’s subject matter jurisdiction.”).
95 Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 435 (2011) (emphasis added).
96 Id.
97 See People v. Mills, 1 N.Y.3d 269, 274 (2003) (“New York courts have long recog-
nized that the statute of limitations defense is not jurisdictional and can be forfeited
or waived by a defendant.”) (emphasis added).
98 See N.Y. CONST. art. VI.
99 See, e.g., Misicki v. Caradonna, 12 N.Y.3d 511, 525 (2009) (Smith, J., dissenting).
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numerous cases reviewing unpreserved claims:100
• Claims alleging that the court failed to inform defense coun-
sel of the contents of a jury note;101
• Defects in accusatory instruments;102
• Questions of statutory interpretation;103
• Ineffective assistance of counsel claims;104
• Illegal sentence claims;105
• Right-to-counsel violations during interrogation.106
If preservation rules were “truly jurisdictional,”107 these well-estab-
lished exceptions would be “incomprehensible.”108
A jurisdictional theory also forces appellate courts to accept
ridiculous legal premises. Suppose, for instance, that the govern-
ment argued at trial that a warrantless search performed by a civil-
ian satisfied the Fourth Amendment because there were exigent
circumstances. The government did not, however, press the more
basic (and correct) argument: the Fourth Amendment does not
apply to searches performed by non-state actors. Under a jurisdic-
tional approach, an appellate court would lack the power to con-
sider the threshold state-action question. In turn, the appellate
court would have to consider what ultimately amounts to a fictional
constitutional question (exigency). Appellate courts should not be
100 Id.
101 See People v. Silva, 24 N.Y.3d 294, 299 (2014).
102 See generally People v. Dumay, 23 N.Y.3d 518 (2014).
103 See, e.g., Richardson v. Fiedler, 67 N.Y.2d 246, 250 (1986) (“The argument raises
solely a question of statutory interpretation, however, which we may address even
though it was not presented below.”); Am. Sugar Ref. Co. of N.Y. v. Waterfront
Comm’n of N.Y. Harbor, 55 N.Y.2d 11, 25 (1982) (“Threshold questions concerning
the interpretation of [statutory] provisions . . . may be made to us not having been
advanced below . . . . Were the [appellate argument] a new one, it would nonetheless
be proper for us to consider it because it is not a contention that could have been
‘obviated or cured by factual showings or legal countersteps,’ turning as it does on
legislative intent.” (quoting Telaro v. Telaro, 25 N.Y.2d 433, 439 (1969))).
104 People v. Lewis, 2 N.Y.3d 224, 232 (2004).
105 People v. Santiago, 22 N.Y.3d 900, 903 (2013) (“[There is a] narrow exception
to [the] preservation rule permitting appellate review when a sentence’s illegality is
readily discernible from the trial record.”) (citations omitted).
106 See generally People v. McLean, 15 N.Y.3d 117 (2010).
107 Misicki v. Caradonna, 12 N.Y.3d 511, 525 (2009) (Smith, J., dissenting).
108 See id. at 525-26 (Smith, J., dissenting); Pushaw, Jr., supra note 65, at 490 n.472
(“Until 1964, however, the [Supreme] Court treated mootness not as an Article III
requirement but as an equitable determination. Indeed, it has long decided several
types of moot cases—for example, those ‘capable of repetition, yet evading re-
view.’ These exceptions are incomprehensible if federal courts lack Article III jurisdic-
tion to resolve moot cases at all. Thus, mootness is, and always has been, a matter of
discretion.”).
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forced to get the law wrong because the parties are inept.109 The
fundamental goal of our appellate system, like that of any judicial
body, is to dole out accurate justice—not to host a moot court.110
IV. THE INSUFFICIENCY EXCEPTION
As preservation is not jurisdictional, it is subject to exceptions
when the policy interests underlying the rule do not apply. Af-
firming baseless convictions on preservation grounds undermines
simple justice and advances no meaningful state interests. Accord-
ingly, the Court of Appeals should adopt a sufficiency exception.
A. Precedent Supports a Sufficiency Exception
When Finch announced a curing approach to preservation of
sufficiency claims, it did not articulate a novel theory.111 Instead, it
affirmed an approach dating back as far as 1870.112 As explained
above, Levin v. Russell referred to the “curing” rule as “well settled
law.”113 Almost a century later, Telaro explained that this long-ac-
knowledged, liberalizing rule is simple justice because baseless
judgments should never stand.114 And while Telaro noted that the
curing rule does not apply to “most constitutional questions,”115
People v. Rodriguez y Paz implicitly rejected that bizarre limitation as
it reviewed a constitutional “question of law which could not have
been obviated by an evidentiary showing at [the] hearing [be-
109 Misicki, 12 N.Y.3d at 525 (Smith, J., dissenting) (“‘[Appellate] judges [do not]
sit as automatons, merely to register their reactions to the arguments which counsel
had made below. The fortunes of litigation might then turn, not on the merits of a
case, but on the skill or prescience of counsel in the court of first instance.’” (quoting
ARTHUR KARGER, THE POWERS OF THE NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS § 17:1, at 591-92
(3d ed., rev. 2005))).
110 See Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 396 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating
that Texas “conceded” that the defendant’s sentence was illegal but argued procedu-
ral default in the Supreme Court; the majority’s refusal to review a conceded sentenc-
ing error indicated that the “unending search for symmetry in the law can cause
judges to forget about justice” and that “[t]his should be a simple case”).
111 See generally People v. Finch, 23 N.Y.3d 408 (2014).
112 See generally id.
113 See Levin v. Russel, 42 N.Y. 251, 255-56 (1870) (“It is the well settled law that
objections to testimony without assigning any ground therefor will be disregarded,
unless it clearly appears that the objection, if properly made, would have been deci-
sive of the case, and could not have been obviated.”); see also Wright v. Wright, 226
N.Y. 578, 578, 579 (1919).
114 See Silverman v. Benmor Coats, Inc., 61 N.Y.2d 299, 314 (1984) (Kaye, J., dissent-
ing) (noting that the “curing” test “has long been acknowledged by this Court.” (cit-
ing Telaro v. Telaro, 25 N.Y.2d 433, 439 (1969))).
115 Telaro, 25 N.Y.2d at 439.
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low.]”116 The Court continues to apply this curing approach to
right-to-counsel violations and illegal-sentence violations, holding
that even if counsel did not raise those claims below, the defendant
can raise them on appeal if the record conclusively reveals an in-
curable violation.117
The Court of Appeals has never overruled this longstanding
“curing” approach. When, for example, Judge Smith advanced this
curing approach in his Misicki dissent (five years before Finch), the
majority and concurrences did not challenge the dissent on prece-
dential grounds.118
Nor should Gray be read as overruling, sub silentio, the long-
standing curing rule. Gray held preservation applicable to suffi-
ciency claims, but in doing so, it relied on a curing rationale:  “A
timely objection alerts all parties to alleged deficiencies in the evi-
dence and advances the truth-seeking purpose of the trial.”119 In-
deed, as Finch explained, Gray’s holding is consistent with a curing
approach because Gray held that “the defendant’s knowledge of
the weight of drugs” argument was unpreserved.120 If counsel had
placed the government on notice of the knowledge defect, the gov-
ernment could have potentially cured the defect at trial.121
The federal circuit courts agree with this curing approach as
they have held that unpreserved arguments are reviewable if the
parties had a full opportunity to debate the relevant facts below.122
The Florida Supreme Court has also expressly applied the curing
116 People v. Rodriguez y Paz, 58 N.Y.2d 327, 336-37 (1983).
117 See generally People v. McLean, 15 N.Y.3d 117 (2010); People v. Santiago, 22
N.Y.3d 900, 903 (2013).
118 Misicki v. Caradonna, 12 N.Y.3d 511, 519-20 (2009); id. at 524 (Graffeo, J.,
dissenting).
119 People v. Gray, 86 N.Y.2d 10, 21 (1995).
120 People v. Finch, 23 N.Y.3d 408, 414-15 (2014) (“Insistence on specificity in a
dismissal motion is amply justified where the People might have cured the problem if
their attention had been called to it. This may well have been true in Gray itself; if the
defendant there had flagged the knowledge-of-narcotic-weight issue, the People
might have reopened their case to supply the missing proof.”).
121 Id.
122 See Vento v. Dir. of Virgin Is. Bureau of Internal Revenue, 715 F.3d 455, 470 (3d
Cir. 2013); Starship Enters. of Atlanta, Inc. v. Coweta Cty., 708 F.3d 1243, 1254 (11th
Cir. 2013); United States v. Wimbley, 553 F.3d 455, 460 (6th Cir. 2009); United States
v. Covarrubia-Mendiola, 241 F. App’x 569, 575 (10th Cir. 2007); Bogle-Assegai v. Con-
necticut, 470 F.3d 498, 504 (2d Cir. 2006); In re Sheridan, 362 F.3d 96, 105 (1st Cir.
2004); Freudensprung v. Offshore Tech. Servs., Inc., 379 F.3d 327, 338 n.5 (5th Cir.
2004); Kingman Park Civic Ass’n v. Williams, 348 F.3d 1033, 1039 (D.C. Cir. 2003);
Amos v. Md. Dep’t of Public Safety and Corr. Servs., 178 F.3d 212, 215 n.2 (4th Cir.
1999); Scott v. Ross, 140 F.3d 1275, 1283-84 (9th Cir. 1998). But see Fleishman v.
Cont’l Cas. Co., 698 F.3d 598, 608 (7th Cir. 2012).
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approach to insufficiency appeals, holding that unpreserved suffi-
ciency claims are reviewable if the appellant argues that no “crime
was committed at all.”123 Under this approach, preservation applies
to technical deficiencies—i.e., the “usual failure-of-evidence
case,”124 but does not apply when, as in Finch, “the facts affirma-
tively proven by the State simply do not constitute the charged of-
fense as a matter of law.”125 In such cases, Florida requires
appellate review because “[there is] no error more fundamental
than the conviction of a defendant in the absence of a prima facie
showing of the essential elements of the crime charged.”126 Under
Florida’s approach, for example, a defendant must raise a chal-
lenge to the value of stolen items in a larceny case (a defect that is
potentially curable),127 but need not argue that undisputed evi-
dence failed to prove that a kidnapping occurred (a defect that is
not curable).128
A sufficiency exception for incurable errors also flows a fortiori
from the Court of Appeals’ “preservation-exceptions” jurispru-
dence. It is a cruel joke to hold that far less-substantial errors (e.g.,
the court’s failure to respond to a jury note,129 and the prosecu-
tor’s failure to allege the essential elements in a misdemeanor com-
plaint130) are immune from preservation, while insufficiency
errors—i.e., “the most fundamental of all possible defects in a
criminal proceeding”—require preservation.131 Further, if an at-
tack on the length of a sentence need not be preserved (e.g., an
argument that the sentence exceeded the maximum),132 an attack
on the government’s constitutional authority to impose any sentence
at all should not have to be preserved either. A curing approach
nullifies these current anomalies in our appellate jurisprudence.
B. Affirming a Baseless Conviction Clashes with Simple Justice
The State has no interest in affirming a baseless conviction.133
123 F.B. v. State, 852 So. 2d 226, 230 (Fla. 2003).
124 E.g., id. at 230; Nelson v. State, 543 So. 2d 1308, 1309 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989).
125 Griffin v. State, 705 So. 2d 572, 574 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998); Stanton v. State, 746
So. 2d 1229, 1230 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999).
126 Dydek v. State, 400 So. 2d 1255, 1258 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981).
127 F.B., 852 So.2d at 227.
128 See Griffin, 705 So. 2d at 574-75 (citing Harris v. State, 647 So. 2d 206 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1994)).
129 See People v. Silva, 24 N.Y.3d 294, 299 (2014).
130 See People v. Dumay, 23 N.Y.3d 518, 521 (2014).
131 People v. Udzinski, 146 A.D.2d 245, 250 (2d Dep’t 1989).
132 People v. Santiago, 22 N.Y.3d 900, 903 (2013).
133 Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 388, 392 (2004); People v. Henderson, 60 Cal. 2d
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Telaro, a matrimonial case, affirmed this rule of simple justice: “No
party should prevail on appeal, given an unimpeachable showing
that he had no case in the trial court.”134 Telaro’s common sense
applies with greater force in criminal cases, where affirming a base-
less conviction means condemning an innocent person to incarcer-
ation in a violent warehouse. Ignoring Telaro’s message in criminal
cases ultimately undermines the “integrity or public reputation” of
our appellate courts and prosecutors,135 and should “cause some to
question whether the State has forgotten its overriding ‘obligation
to serve the cause of justice.’”136
The government’s interest in reversing a baseless conviction is
particularly pressing when the government has failed to prove
identity (that is, the government “got the wrong guy”).137 In those
cases, the government has locked someone up who did nothing
wrong. If an appellate court affirms the baseless conviction on pro-
cedural grounds, “the true culprit escapes punishment.”138
C. Affirming Baseless and “Incurable” Convictions Advances No
Preservation “Interests”
The Court of Appeals has articulated several justifications for
the preservation rule:
• Inducement to object, which in turn promotes “efficiency”
and “finality”;139
• Guidance to the appellate courts;140
• Fairness to the trial judge;141 and
• Opportunity to cure.142
As shown below, the inducement, guidance, and “fairness to
trial judge” rationales are illegitimate grounds for affirming a base-
less conviction. On the other hand, the curing rationale is valid.143
482, 497 (1963) (“[T]he state has no interest in preserving erroneous judgments
. . . .”).
134 Telaro v. Telaro, 25 N.Y.2d 433, 439 (1969) (internal citations omitted).
135 United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
136 Haley, 541 U.S. at 398 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Agurs,
427 U.S. 97, 111 (1976)).
137 See, e.g., Dist. Attorney’s Office v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 99 (2009) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
138 See id.
139 See, e.g., People v. Hawkins, 11 N.Y.3d 484, 492-93 (2008); People v. Gray, 86
N.Y.2d 10, 20-21 (1995).
140 See Hawkins, 11 N.Y.3d at 493.
141 See People v. Finch, 23 N.Y.3d 408, 435 (Abdus-Salaam, J., dissenting).
142 Gray, 86 N.Y.2d at 20-21.
143 Finch, 23 N.Y.3d at 414.
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Accordingly, the preservation exception should be pinned to that
interest: if a sufficiency objection would have allowed the govern-
ment to “cure” its insufficient case, preservation is required. On
the other hand, when the record conclusively establishes insuffi-
cient evidence, preservation is not required.
1. The “Inducement” Interest
Although courts often claim that preservation doctrine pro-
motes efficiency and finality,144 that is not really true. Timely objec-
tions promote those interests, and the preservation rule only
advances those interests if it incentivizes timely objections. Thus, the
theory of preservation rules (in general and in the sufficiency con-
text) is that by punishing trial lawyers with preservation affirmance,
the court system scares future litigants into making arguments they
otherwise would omit.145 Here’s how the theory works:
1. The threat of waiver “induces” a lawyer to object on suffi-
ciency grounds.
2. The objection gives the judge the chance to consider the
sufficiency issue.
3. If the judge accepts the argument, the judge can prevent
needless future proceedings (e.g., jury deliberations, sen-
tencing, and an appeal), thus saving resources. Further, the
judge can bring the case to a swift “final” end, thus promot-
ing the State’s purported interest in finality.146
As shown below, the resources and finality interests underlying
the inducement rationale are not cognizable in the insufficiency
context. Even if they were, affirming convictions on preservation
grounds does not advance those interests. And finally, even if the
inducement theory did successfully advance valid interests, that
theory requires appellate courts to ignore the right to effective as-
sistance of counsel and unfairly punishes lay (often poor) clients
instead of their hapless lawyers. On balance, the inducement the-
ory does not justify Gray.
144 See id. 414-16; see also Hawkins, 11 N.Y.3d at 492; Gray, 86 N.Y.2d at 21.
145 See, e.g., Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 89-90 (1977); see also id. at 112 (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting).
146 See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 309 (1989) (“Without finality, the criminal law
is deprived of much of its deterrent effect.”); see also Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S.
1, 25 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“[Finality ensures] attention will ultimately be
focused not on whether a conviction was free from error but rather on whether the
prisoner can be restored to a useful place in the community.”); Paul M. Bator, Finality
in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 451
(1963).
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a. “Resources” and “Finality” Interests Are Not Cognizable in the
Sufficiency Context
The resources interest offends liberty. Under this theory, the
State sacrifices an innocent individual’s liberty in order to provide
future economic benefits to the whole. That view of the law—
which, if uttered in other political contexts, would be dubbed
“communism,” “socialism,” or some other “ism”—is misguided.
This finality theory is also bizarre as applied to insufficiency
appeals. Essentially, the appellate message sent to an innocent de-
fendant is, “we have a strong interest in quickly and finally an-
nouncing your innocence, but if you wait a few months to argue
your innocence, we no longer care.” That is a strange view of
justice.
The resources and finality interests also clash with the Legisla-
ture’s policies. In creating a comprehensive appellate regime, the
Legislature has expressly announced an interest in spending
money on appeals in order to nullify baseless convictions, includ-
ing convictions based on insufficient evidence.147 The Legislature
has concluded that accuracy trumps money.
Similarly, the Legislature has rejected the “finality” interest.
The statutory and constitutional creation of an appellate right re-
flects a policy decision that getting it right is more important than
getting it done.148 The same holds true for the Legislature’s deci-
sion to create a post-conviction remedy, which permits numerous
distinct attacks on a conviction—without a statutory time limit.149
147 N.Y. CRIM PROC. LAW § 470.15(2)(a) (McKinney 2015) (authorizing appellate
dismissal when the evidence is insufficient).
148 See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 147 (1982) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“Nor are
we told why society should be eager to ensure the finality of a conviction arguably
tainted by unreviewed constitutional error directly affecting the truthfinding function
of the trial.”); see also Wainwright, 433 U.S. at 115 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[T]he
very existence of the well-established right collaterally to reopen issues previously liti-
gated before the state courts . . . represents a congressional policy choice that is in-
consistent with notions of strict finality . . . .”); Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217,
237 (1969) (“[E]xalt[ing] the value of finality in criminal judgments at the expense of
the interest of each prisoner in the vindication of his constitutional rights . . . runs
contrary to the most basic precepts of our system of post-conviction relief.”); Bass v.
Estelle, 696 F.2d 1154, 1162 (5th Cir. 1983) (Goldberg, J., specially concurring) (“Yes,
there must be an end to criminal litigation. Our duty as judges, a duty we may not
shirk, is to ensure that the ending is a constitutional one. Some things go beyond
time.”).
149 See People v. Corso, 40 N.Y.2d 578, 580 (1976) (“Of course, it should be noted
that if a petitioner possesses an underlying claim relating to the validity of his convic-
tion which falls within the enumerated grounds set forth in CPL 440.10, he may move
at nisi prius to vacate the judgment at any time.”).
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Lastly, the premises of the finality theory do not apply in the
sufficiency context. The finality theory posits that blocking appeals
(1) enhances deterrence (because appeals render punishment un-
certain); (2) promotes rehabilitation (because a final judgment
will cause the defendant to face the reality of conviction); and (3)
saves State resources.150 These finality-based interests are only ad-
vanced if the defendant does not appeal. But even under a Gray re-
gime, defendants convicted with insufficient evidence will still
appeal because they will pursue “weight of the evidence” review,151
“interest of justice” review,152 or ineffective assistance of counsel
review.153 Stripped of its underlying justifications, the finality the-
ory amounts to nothing more than an argument that convicted
people should stay convicted.
b. The Inducement Theory Does No Efficiency or Finality Work in
the Sufficiency Context
Even if resources and finality are cognizable interests in this
context, the inducement theory does no meaningful “inducement”
work in the sufficiency context because preservation rules don’t in-
duce sufficiency objections. As the Supreme Court recently put it
in a different preservation context, absent the threat of a “preserva-
tion punishment,” “counsel normally has other [very] good rea-
sons for calling a trial court’s attention to potential [insufficiency]
error.”154 If trial counsel wins a sufficiency argument, his client is
not only free to go, but double jeopardy bars a government appeal
even if the sufficiency ruling rests on a fundamental misinterpreta-
tion of the penal law.155 If there is a lawyer who is not incentivized
by this windfall, but is somehow incentivized by the distant pros-
pect of “preservation” affirmance, that lawyer, “like the unicorn . . .
finds his home in the imagination, not the courtroom.”156
Additionally, reviewing an unpreserved sufficiency claim ad-
vances efficiency. If a defendant has a winning sufficiency claim,
and he loses the claim on preservation grounds in the Appellate
Division, he will pursue collateral relief in state and federal courts,
150 See, e.g., Bator, supra note 146, at 452.
151 CRIM. PROC. § 470.15(5); People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 349 (2007).
152 CRIM. PROC. § 470.15(6)(a).
153 See People v. Heidgen, 22 N.Y.3d 259, 278 (2013).
154 Henderson v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1121, 1128 (2013).
155 See generally Evans v. Michigan, 133 S. Ct. 1069 (2013); see also People v. Brown,
40 N.Y.2d 381, 391 (1976) (“Double jeopardy principles will bar appeal unless there is
available a determination of guilt which without more may be reinstated in the event
of a reversal and remand.”).
156 Henderson, 133 S. Ct. at 1129.
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thus consuming more government resources. If our aim is to save
money, we should promote direct appellate review, instead of kick-
ing the can down the post-conviction road.
Assuming successful inducement, preservation still fails to do
any meaningful work in this context. Recall that the purpose of the
inducement doctrine is to promote early objections and thus pre-
vent needless future proceedings (e.g., an appeal). In the suffi-
ciency context, it is unlikely that a timely sufficiency argument will
prevent future proceedings.
Unlike pre-verdict dismissals, post-verdict dismissals are appeal-
able and do not trigger double jeopardy.157 Thus, to ensure appel-
late review, the Court of Appeals has expressly instructed trial judges
to reserve judgment on sufficiency arguments, send the case to the
jury, and then rule on the motion after the verdict.158 So, even if
defense counsel makes a timely, pre-verdict motion to dismiss, that
motion will often fail to prevent needless litigation because the
trial court will reserve judgment, send the case to the jury, find
insufficient evidence after the verdict, and then the government
will appeal anyway.
Even if we assume that (1) the preservation rule induces argu-
ments and (2) prompts early dismissal, the inducement theory still
fails because applying preservation to sufficiency appeals violates
the constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel.
To show ineffective assistance of counsel, an appellant must
show that trial counsel’s performance was “unreasonable” and vio-
lated professional norms, and that the professionally unreasonable
performance prejudiced the outcome of the case.159 The failure to
157 See United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 91 n.7 (1978); see also People v. Payne, 3
N.Y.3d 266, 277 n.4 (2004) (Read, J., dissenting).
158 People v. Key, 45 N.Y.2d 111, 120 (1978) (“If trial courts in cases like this one were,
whenever practicable, only to reserve decision until after trial has been completed and determina-
tions of fact made, much difficulty would be avoided. Of course, if the motion had been
made and decided, as it should have been, before trial, no problem would have
arisen. But, once trial has started, decision on a belated motion might well be delayed
until after jury verdict or decision on the facts. If defendant were to be acquitted, that
would be the end of the matter; if convicted, appeal of the ruling, and, if appropriate,
retrial or reinstatement of the verdict or decision would be permissible on any view of
double jeopardy doctrine. It is the premature dismissal that has caused the trouble in
this case, and that should be avoidable in most other cases.”) (emphasis added); Peo-
ple v. Marin, 102 A.D.2d 14, 15 (1st Dep’t 1984) (“Although the Judge expressed full
agreement with the defense’s position on the deficiency of the evidence, he reserved
decision on the motion and permitted the jury to consider the charges. In doing so,
the Judge was seeking to preserve the prosecution’s right to appellate review.”) (em-
phasis added).
159 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691-92 (1984).
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preserve a winning sufficiency argument invariably prejudices the
defendant because it allows an illegal conviction to stand. There-
fore, the only potential roadblock to an ineffective assistance claim
is the “reasonable lawyering” prong. It is hard to imagine a case in
which a counsel’s failure to raise a winning sufficiency argument
would be “reasonable” lawyering. I am aware of no case holding as
much,160 and given that sufficiency preservation is fairly simple
(counsel need only utter a few sentences to preserve the point), it
is unlikely that counsel’s failure to raise a winning sufficiency argu-
ment will ever be found reasonable. Thus, applying preservation
rules to sufficiency violates the right to effective assistance of trial
counsel. And for that very reason, the theory is essentially useless
because appellants can bypass the preservation problem by simply
arguing to the appellate court that counsel was ineffective.
The Supreme Court’s federal-habeas-procedural-default juris-
prudence hammers home this point.161 The Court has declined to
enforce state preservation rules when the default stemmed from
ineffective assistance of counsel.162 As Murray v. Carrier held, “if the
procedural default is the result of ineffective assistance of counsel,
the Sixth Amendment itself requires that responsibility for the de-
fault be imputed to the State, which may not conduct trials at
which persons who face incarceration must defend themselves
without adequate legal assistance.”163 And as Justice Blackmun
stressed several years later, “[t]o permit a procedural default
caused by attorney error egregious enough to constitute ineffective
assistance of counsel to preclude federal habeas review of a state
prisoner’s federal claims in no way serves the State’s interest in pre-
serving the integrity of its rules and proceedings.”164 By this federal
logic, the state courts should also decline to enforce procedural
default when the default stems from ineffective assistance of
counsel.
160 See People v. McPherson, 22 N.Y.3d 259, 278 (2013) (“Even if a reasonable de-
fense lawyer might have questioned whether a motion to dismiss . . . was a ‘clear
winner,’ he or she could not have reasonably determined that the argument was ‘so
weak as to be not worth raising.’” (quoting People v. Turner, 5 N.Y.3d 476, 483
(2005))).
161 See, e.g., Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986) (dismissing petition for habeas
review of procedurally defaulted discovery claim because competent counsel’s failure
to raise a substantive claim of error did not establish cause for the default).
162 See id. at 488-89 (acknowledging that when a defendant is represented by coun-
sel whose performance is not constitutionally deficient under the Strickland standard,
the defendant bears the burden of any resulting procedural defaults).
163 Id. at 488 (internal citations and alterations omitted).
164 Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 773 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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Finally, even if the preservation doctrine did some “induce-
ment” work in this context, putting aside the ineffective-assistance
problems, the inducement theory is still fundamentally unfair be-
cause it punishes the wrong person:
Punishing a lawyer’s unintentional errors[, that is, failures to ob-
ject,] by closing the . . . courthouse door to his client is both a
senseless and misdirected method of deter[rence] . . . . [E]ven if
the penalization of incompetence or carelessness will encourage
more thorough legal training and trial preparation, the [client],
as opposed to his lawyer, hardly is the proper recipient of such a
penalty. Especially with fundamental constitutional rights at
stake, no fictional relationship of principal-agent or the like can
justify holding the criminal defendant accountable for the na-
ked errors of his attorney . . . . [I]f responsibility for error must
be apportioned between the parties, it is the State, through its
attorney’s admissions and certification policies, that is more
fairly held to blame for the fact that practicing lawyers too often
are ill-prepared or ill-equipped to act carefully and knowledge-
ably when faced with decisions governed by state procedural
requirements.165
In sum, the inducement theory advances invalid interests;
does no inducement work; only applies to cases where the defen-
dant’s representation violated the Constitution; and unfairly pun-
ishes the wrong party. The theory is hardly a solid foundation for a
legal rule.
2. The Guidance Rationale
The Court of Appeals has stated that objections induce lower-
court decisions, which in turn provide “guidance” to the appellate
courts.166 But sapping an appellate court’s sufficiency review power
because the trial court did not “educate” the higher court is absurd
and demeans the competency of the appellate courts. Granted,
lower court analysis may be preferable, but it is not important
enough to justify affirming a baseless conviction.
Indeed, the Legislature has implicitly rejected a guidance ra-
tionale.167 Under C.P.L. § 470.35(1), a party can raise a claim in the
Court of Appeals that it did not raise in the Appellate Division,168
and can raise unpreserved claims before the Appellate Division
165 Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 113-14 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
166 See People v. Hawkins, 11 N.Y.3d 484, 492-93 (2008).
167 See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 470.15(6)(a), 470.35(1) (McKinney 2015).
168 Id. § 470.35(1) (“Upon an appeal to the court of appeals from an order of an
intermediate appellate court affirming a judgment, sentence or order of a criminal
court, the court of appeals may consider and determine . . . any question of law . . .
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under that court’s “interest of justice” power.169 If the Legislature
thought lower court guidance was so important, it would not have
adopted such rules.
3. Fairness to the Trial Judge
The Finch dissent stated that reaching an unpreserved suffi-
ciency claim is “manifest[ly] unfair” to the trial court.170 It is un-
clear why correcting a sufficiency error is “unfair” to the trial court.
Indeed, one would hope that the trial judge would prefer that a
baseless conviction be reversed.
In any event, fairness to the trial judge is not a cognizable state
interest, and it certainly cannot offset the countervailing liberty in-
terests. The appellate system does not exist to ensure fairness to
the state actor overseeing the trial. It is designed to protect the
public’s interest in the enforcement of the criminal law and the
accused’s interest in a fair, accurate proceeding.171
4. The “Substitute Procedures” Rationale
Gray held that barring mandatory review of unpreserved suffi-
ciency claims is tolerable because defendants can still seek discre-
tionary review under the Appellate Division’s “interest of justice”
review power:
[C]oncerns that defendants’ rights are diminished by the hold-
ing here are misplaced. It should be emphasized that even
where defendants have failed to adequately preserve claims for
appellate review, they may request that the Appellate Divisions
apply their “interest of justice” jurisdiction under CPL 470.15
(3). Nothing we hold here intrudes upon that jurisdiction.172
Finch expressly rejected this argument:
The dissent responds by saying, essentially, that procedural rules
do sometimes require us to uphold convictions of people who
may be innocent, and that the task of avoiding such injustices
must sometimes be left to the Appellate Division, which has in-
terest-of-justice jurisdiction. True enough; but procedural rules
regardless of whether such question was raised, considered or determined upon the
appeal to the intermediate appellate court.”).
169 Id. § 470.15(6)(a).
170 People v. Finch, 23 N.Y.3d 408, 435 (2014) (Abdus-Salaam, J., dissenting) (“In
relying so heavily on the alleged absence of prejudice to the People, the majority
ignores the manifest unfairness its decision inflicts on the trial court.”).
171 See Boris M. Komar, On the Reform of Appellate Procedures of the United States Supreme
Court, 44 CHICAGO-KENT L. REV. 28, 35 (1967) (“[T]he sole purpose for the existence
of the courts [is] to serve and aid the people in their quest for justice.”).
172 People v. Gray, 86 N.Y.2d 10, 22 (1995).
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should be so designed as to keep unjust results to a minimum.
We think our interpretation of Gray serves that end better than
the dissent’s.173
Finch was right. Discretionary review is no substitute for
mandatory review. Unless we assume that our appellate bureau-
cracy never makes discretionary mistakes, some baseless convic-
tions will invariably be affirmed under a discretionary system. Since
applying preservation rules to sufficiency claims accomplishes virtu-
ally nothing, there is no need to accept the risk that some cases will
slip through the discretionary cracks.174
5. The Curing Interest
Unlike the four theories discussed above, Finch’s curing theory
is sound. The curing theory recognizes that objections can remind
the government of evidentiary problems, thus prompting the gov-
ernment to re-open its case to cure the deficiency.175 Even Justice
Brennan, an outspoken critic of procedural default, endorsed this
interest.176
The government has the burden of proof, and the defendant
has no obligation to help it make its case.177 People v. Whipple there-
fore limits the government’s power to re-open its case to “narrow
circumstances” of curing a “technical” omission, such as the num-
ber of parking spots in a drunk-driving-in-a-parking-lot prosecution
(there must be at least “four” spaces).178 Thus, in theory, a suffi-
ciency objection could induce the government to re-open its case
to fix a “technical mistake.” Preservation should be pinned to the
government’s ability to cure. If the government could have “cured”
the sufficiency defect under Whipple, appellate review is barred. If
the government could not have cured the sufficiency problem, ap-
pellate review is required.
D. Due Process Requires a Sufficiency Exception
Even if statutory analysis did not require a sufficiency excep-
173 Finch, 23 N.Y.3d at 415-16 (internal citation omitted).
174 See id.
175 Id. at 414.
176 Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 112 n.11 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“In
my view, the strongest plausible argument for strict enforcement of a contemporane-
ous-objection rule is one that the Court barely relies on at all: the possibility that the
failure of timely objection to the admissibility of evidence may foreclose the making
of a fresh record and thereby prejudice the prosecution in later litigation involving
that evidence.”).
177 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 70.20 (McKinney 2015).
178 People v. Whipple, 97 N.Y.2d 1, 7-8 (2001).
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tion, constitutional analysis does. Affirming a baseless conviction
on preservation grounds violates procedural due process under the
state and federal constitutions. At a minimum, there is “constitu-
tional doubt” about the issue, thus courts should resolve that doubt
in favor of an exception.179
Suppose the Legislature passed the following statute: “The Ap-
pellate Division cannot consider an appeal unless trial counsel filed
a memorandum of law that was, at a minimum, 100 pages and cited
every single case on the appellate issue.” This hypothetical proce-
dural rule imposes an insurmountable, arbitrary burden on the ap-
pellant. But are rules like this subject to procedural due process
attack? Is the Legislature free to create whatever rules it wants in
this arena? This section contends that procedural due process cov-
ers rules governing access to appellate reversals. Under that due
process analysis, rules that affirm convictions on preservation
grounds are unconstitutional unless the government can show that
they advance a meaningful state interest. As shown above, in the
sufficiency context, the government cannot make that showing.
The state and federal due process clauses guarantee that “[n]o
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law.”180 At bottom, the clause bans “arbitrary” govern-
ment power.181 Procedural due process requires a balancing of (1)
the government’s interest in the challenged procedure; and (2)
the countervailing liberty interests.182
Procedural due process analysis only applies when the chal-
lenged procedures implicate a liberty interest or a statutory “enti-
tlement.”183 Here, the right to an appellate judgment on the merits
implicates two basic liberty interests: the basic right to be free from
physical incarceration and the statutory right to present a suffi-
ciency claim to the appellate court.
179 E.g., People v. Correa, 15 N.Y.3d 213, 232 (2010) (“Where the language of a
statute is susceptible of two constructions, the courts will adopt that which avoids . . .
constitutional doubts . . . .” (internal quotes omitted) (citing In re Jacob, 86 N.Y.2d
651, 667 (1995))); Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S 224, 260 (1998)
(Scalia, J, dissenting) (“[T]he answer to the constitutional question is not clear. It is
the Court’s burden . . . to establish that its constitutional answer shines forth clearly
from our cases.”).
180 U.S. CONST. amend. 14 § 1; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6.
181 See Stuart v. Palmer, 74 N.Y. 183, 190-91 (1878).
182 See Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2517-18 (2011); see also Mathews v. El-
dridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976); People v. Peque, 22 N.Y.3d 168, 175 (2013); People
v. David W., 95 N.Y.2d 130, 136 (2000).
183 See Dist. Attorney’s Office v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 67 (2009) (“[The Due Pro-
cess Clause of the 14th Amendment] imposes procedural limitations on a State’s
power to take away protected entitlements.”).
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The Supreme Court’s analysis in District Attorney’s Office v. Os-
borne is on point.184 Osborne held that because an Alaska law created
a statutory right to obtain vacatur of a conviction upon demonstrat-
ing “innocence with new evidence,” an Alaskan had an “entitle-
ment” to an appeal, thus triggering procedural due process
analysis.185
The Texas Supreme Court agrees that appellate procedural
bars are subject to due process analysis.186 In re M.S. held that “be-
cause Texas provides the right of an appeal from a judgment on
parental-rights termination, part of the process of ensuring the ac-
curacy of judgments necessarily involves appellate review.”187 In so
holding, the Texas Supreme Court relied on the United States Su-
preme Court’s pronouncement that although there is no constitu-
tional right to an appeal, the Legislature cannot arbitrarily limit
the appellate right:
[I]t is now fundamental that, once established, these avenues
must be kept free of unreasoned distinctions that can only im-
pede open and equal access to the courts. Thus, error preserva-
tion in the trial court, which is a threshold to appellate review,
necessarily must be viewed through the due process prism. In this con-
text, we review our rule governing preservation of a complaint
of factual sufficiency under the procedural due process analysis
established by Mathews v. Eldridge.188
The Texas Supreme Court’s conclusion is sound. Preservation
rules are essentially filing rules; they require the appellant to pre-
sent a claim in a particular manner before a particular judicial
body (the trial court).189 Like filing rules, preservation rules are
also subject to procedural due process analysis.190
Under a balancing analysis, affirming a baseless conviction on
preservation grounds violates due process. As shown above, the
government has no interest in blocking incurable sufficiency ap-
184 See id. at 67-70.
185 See id. at 52-70.
186 See In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 342 (Tex. 2009); see also In re M.S., 115 S.W.3d
534, 546-50 (Tex. 2003); In re B.L.D., 113 S.W.3d 340, 352-55 (Tex. 2003).
187 In re M.S., 115 S.W.3d at 546.
188 Id. at 547 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)) (emphasis added).
189 See In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 342 (“[B]ecause error preservation in the trial
court is the ‘threshold to appellate review,’ . . . it should be reviewed under . . .
procedural due process analysis . . . .”).
190 E.g., In re A.M., 312 S.W.3d 76, 86-87 (Tex. App. 2010) (analyzing petition filing
deadlines for adoption under Mathews); In re C.M., 652 N.W.2d 204, 208-09, 212-13
(Iowa 2002) (analyzing Iowa’s filing deadlines and brief format rules under Mathews);
Turner v. State, 839 S.W.2d 46, 47 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (analyzing filing deadlines
under due process clause).
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peals on preservation grounds. On the other hand, the counter-
vailing liberty interests—the basic right to be free from physical
incarceration, the right to avoid harsh stigma, and the right to
work—are significant.191 On balance, Gray violates procedural due
process.
But the analysis may not be that simple. Arguably, the flexible
Mathews balancing standard does not apply to criminal procedural
rules. Instead, the rigid Patterson v. New York standard applies.192
The rigid Patterson standard considers whether a procedure “of-
fends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and con-
science of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.”193 Because
Mathews arose in the civil (administrative law) context,194 Medina v.
California held that, as a matter of federal due process, the flexible
Mathews balancing applies to civil cases (e.g., social security bene-
fits) while the stringent Patterson rule covers the criminal realm.195
If Patterson covers New York’s preservation rules, Gray may survive
because, arguably, Gray does not “offend[ ] some principle of jus-
tice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to
be ranked as fundamental” (whatever that means).196
The Patterson argument is flawed for numerous reasons:
First, even if the “conscience of our people” analysis was the
federal criminal due process test,197 the New York Court of Appeals
has never held, let alone suggested, that the state due process
clause incorporates that subjective test.198
191 See Dist. Attorney’s Office v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 93 (2009) (“The ‘most ele-
mental’ of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause is ‘the interest in being
free from physical detention by one’s own government.’”) (quoting Hamdi v. Rum-
sfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004) (plurality)); see also Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71,
80 (1992) (“Freedom from bodily restraint has always been at the core of the liberty
protected by the Due Process Clause . . . .”).
192 Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201-02 (1977); Medina v. California, 505
U.S. 437, 453-56 (1992) (O’Connor, J., concurring); Gerald L. Neuman, The Habeas
Corpus Suspension Clause After Boumediene v. Bush, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 537, 555
(2010) (“[The] procedural due process field . . . Mathews v. Eldridge competes with
older judicial precedents, historical practices, and area-specific deference, and the
Justices have debated its proper scope of application.”).
193 Patterson, 432 U.S. at 202 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
194 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 323-26 (1976) (concerning what process was
due to a recipient of social security disability benefits whose benefits had been
terminated).
195 Medina, 505 U.S. at 443 (1992) (“In our view, the Mathews balancing test does
not provide the appropriate framework for assessing the validity of state procedural
rules which, like the one at bar, are part of the criminal process.”).
196 Patterson, 432 U.S. at 202 (citations omitted).
197 Id.
198 See, e.g., People v. Davis, 13 N.Y.3d 17, 27 (2009) (applying Mathews) (citations
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Second, the Patterson test ignores that the basic purpose of due
process is fairness—not compliance with tradition. Permitting the
government to adopt unfair, arbitrary rules, simply because “our
people” have not yet condemned the practice,199 violates that basic
purpose. Indeed, by worshiping tradition over fairness, Patterson
prevents courts from “responding to new forms of injustice that
lack any historical antecedent,” “consider[ing] the constitutionality
of historically accepted practices that come to be regarded as un-
just in light of evolving concepts of fairness,” and “reconsider[ing]
the constitutionality of practices that a prior Court approved.”200
Third, as the “conscience of our people” is in the eye of the
beholder, a liberal judge will have a different conception of our
“people’s conscience” than a conservative judge. Thus, this subjec-
tive test produces a flimsy, result-oriented jurisprudence.
Fourth, as a textual matter, Patterson forgets that the Due Pro-
cess Clause guarantees “due process,” not “traditional process” or
“process consistent with the conscience of our people.”201 Absent a
clear directive from our constitutional framers to freeze our rights
in time or to subject procedural rights to a straw poll of the Ameri-
can “conscience,” the courts should interpret flexible constitu-
tional text to permit flexibility.
Fifth, Patterson clashes with due process as we know it. The Su-
preme Court has consistently held that due process requires rights
that were neither traditionally guaranteed nor “ranked as funda-
mental.”202 As Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Medina ex-
plained, if we take the Patterson approach seriously, we end up with
a legal system that does not include Brady (the right to exculpatory
omitted); see also People v. Thompson, 90 N.Y.2d 615, 621 (1997) (applying the bal-
ancing test); People v. Scalza, 76 N.Y.2d 604, 610 (1990) (applying the balancing test).
199 See Patterson, 432 U.S. at 202.
200 Bruce J. Winick, Presumptions and Burdens of Proof in Determining Competency to
Stand Trial: An Analysis of Medina v. California and the Supreme Court’s New Due Process
Methodology in Criminal Cases, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 817, 830-32 (1993).
201 See Patterson, 432 U.S. at 202.
202 See Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 454 (1992) (O’Connor, J., concurring)
(citing Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985) (due process right to psychiatric exami-
nation when sanity is significantly in question); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284
(1973) (due process right to introduce certain evidence); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384
U.S. 333 (1966) (due process right to protection from prejudicial publicity and court-
room disruptions); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (due process right to trial
transcript on appeal); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (due process right to
discovery of exculpatory evidence)); see also Donald A. Dripps, Miscarriages of Justice
and the Constitution, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 635, 652-53 (1999) (discussing Medina v.
California); accord Winick, supra note 200, at 827.
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evidence does not have historical grounding),203 numerous due
process cases invaliding arbitrary state evidentiary rules,204 and a
host of other well-established opinions.205
Sixth, applying Patterson to criminal cases but applying Ma-
thews to civil cases produces absurdity. Under that analysis, a restric-
tive standard applies to criminal law (where life or liberty is at
stake) but a flexible, expansive standard covers administrative hear-
ings such as disability benefits hearings,206 and horse-racing-li-
cense-suspension procedures.207 Where the liberty stakes are
higher, the State must afford more protection, not less.
Seventh, Patterson is grounded in the federalism concept that
“preventing and dealing with crime is much more the business of
the States than it is of the Federal Government.”208 This argument
is a non-starter. The states may be in the business of incarceration,
but the Due Process Clause requires that the states conduct that
business fairly.209 Further, this federalism rationale has no bearing
on the state constitutional analysis. Even if the federal courts must
treat state criminal procedure as some kind of unregulated free
market, the state courts retain the power to regulate their own state
governments.210
Finally, post-Medina precedent supports application of the Ma-
thews test.211 In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the Court reviewed an American
citizen’s right to challenge his detention for aiding the Taliban in
Afghanistan.212 A plurality applied Mathews in analyzing the proce-
dural due process claim.213 The dissent’s criticism of the majority’s
reliance on Mathews balancing demonstrates that the test’s applica-
203 See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
204 See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 56 (1987); see also Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S.
683, 691 (1986); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
205 Medina, 505 U.S. at 454 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
206 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
207 Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55 (1979).
208 Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201 (1977) (citing Irvine v. California, 347
U.S. 128, 134 (1954) (plurality)).
209 See William J. Brennan, J., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State
Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 535, 546 (1986) (“This
country has been transformed by the standards, promises, and power of the Four-
teenth Amendment— . . . ‘that each of us is entitled to due process of law and equal
protection of the laws from our state governments no less than from our national
one.’”) (quoting William J. Brennan, J., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individ-
ual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 490 (1977)).
210 See U.S. CONST. amend. X.
211 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (plurality).
212 See id.
213 Id. at 528-29 (“The ordinary mechanism that we use for balancing such serious
competing interests, and for determining the procedures that are necessary to ensure
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tion was central to that decision.214 Thus, Hamdi calls into question
Medina’s holding that Mathews is limited to “civil procedure.”
True, Osborne applied Patterson to a due process claim.215 But
the majority opinion neither discussed the debate over the appro-
priate due process standard nor grappled with Hamdi’s recent ap-
plication of Mathews.216 Therefore, while Osborne cuts in favor of a
Patterson approach (to federal due process analysis), it should not
be read as affirmatively resolving this question.217
But let’s assume Patterson applies. Under that test, we must
consider whether affirming a baseless conviction because counsel
did not object below “offends some principle of justice so rooted in
the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fun-
damental.”218  Discerning the “traditions and conscience of our
people” is challenging. Whatever that nebulous phrase means,
locking people up without proof beyond a reasonable doubt passes
that test. While some may support affirming baseless convictions,
the vast majority of “our people” would likely be shocked to learn
that innocent people can languish in prison because their lawyers
failed to say a few words at trial.
V. CONCLUSION
When appellate courts affirm baseless convictions, they ignore
the basic duty of our judicial system: to ensure accurate verdicts.
While Gray ignored that simple premise, Finch revived it, as it
strongly suggested that where the record conclusively reveals an il-
legal conviction, that conviction should never stand. It is now time
for the Court of Appeals to fully embrace that common sense and
establish an insufficiency exception to the preservation rule.219
That exception promotes liberty, advances justice, and does no
harm. It should be the law.
that a citizen is not ‘deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,’
is the test that we articulated in Mathews v. Eldridge.”) (internal citations omitted).
214 Id. at 575-76 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[The plurality] claims authority to engage
in this sort of ‘judicious balancing’ from Mathews v. Eldridge, a case involving . . . the
withdrawal of disability benefits! Whatever the merits of this technique when newly rec-
ognized property rights are at issue (and even there they are questionable), it has no
place where the Constitution and the common law already supply an answer.”).
215 See Dist. Attorney’s Office v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 67 (2009).
216 Id. at 67-68.
217 Id.
218 Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 202 (1977) (quoting Snyder v. Massachu-
setts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
219 Telaro v. Telaro, 25 N.Y.2d 433, 439 (1969).
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